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This case is intended to illustrate key trade-offs in planning the acquisition of 
a major weapon system.  In particular, the impact of logistics and maintenance 
decisions on life-cycle costs and readiness are examined.  The case provides 
sufficient data to allow a rich discussion of issues and trade-offs—without being 
overwhelming.  The case raises strategic policy issues but provides an analytical 
framework and data so that the policy issues can be discussed in detail, and not 
merely with generalities. 
Logistics and maintenance issues examined within the case include the spare 
parts service levels and reliability of major components, depot and preventive 
maintenance turnaround times, as well as planning for exogenous factors such as 
variability in the price of petroleum, oil, and lubricants.  By examining a set of related 
decisions simultaneously, the case allows students to explore the relative leverage 
of logistics and maintenance decisions on cost and readiness.  By examining 
endogenous as well as exogenous factors, the case allows students to examine the 
impact of factors within the control of program managers as well the impact of 
factors beyond their control on budget and readiness risk.  The intent of the case is 
to move beyond planning simple budget and readiness targets and to encourage 
students to discuss methods of robust contingency planning.  
Specific learning objectives include 
an understanding of the life-cycle cost implications of logistics and 
maintenance decisions, 
an understanding of the readiness implications of logistics and maintenance 
decisions, 
an understanding of the trade-offs between life-cycle cost and readiness, 
an understanding of the implications of logistics and maintenance factors on 
readiness risk, and 
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an understanding of the implications of logistics and maintenance factors on 
budget risk. 
The development of this case was supported by the Naval Postgraduate 
School.  This case was prepared by Dr. Keebom Kang and Dr. Kenneth Doerr for 
use in Dr. Kang’s Logistics Engineering class at the Naval Postgraduate School.  A 
teaching note is available for instructors at educational institutions by requesting a 
copy from Dr. Kang.       
Keywords: life-cycle cost analysis; major weapon system;  risk analysis on 
readiness and budget, spare parts critical protection levels; inventory fill rates;  





Given the looming controversies over the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a small 
group of naval acquisition mavericks began meeting in secret to discuss the 
development of an alternative aircraft that would incorporate many of the state-of-the-art 
technologies of the JSF but would be dedicated to the narrower missions of the Navy 
and Marines.  Unlike past design projects, the aircraft would have cost targets, and 
especially ownership cost targets, as a primary design criteria.  The secret group called 
themselves the F-Team, reflecting either their focus on fighter aircraft or the grades they 
received in graduate school. 
Knowing that the project would be doomed to failure without the design and 
manufacturing support that industry could provide, the F-Team used its contacts in the 
Aerospace Industry Association (AIA) to reach out to like-minded individuals from 
multiple defense companies.  These defense company engineers were dedicated to 
rescuing the tarnished image of their profession by developing a design for an 
affordable, state-of-the-art aircraft in record time.   They took as their role model the 
North American Aviation team that had designed and built the P-51 Mustang aircraft 
prototype (arguably the best American fighter aircraft in World War II) in 100 days. 
The F-Team had assembled the skills it needed for its project, but it still needed 
development funding.  It knew that seeking funds through official channels would kill the 
project.  The AIA professionals needed resources.  The F-Team needed $2 billion in a 
hurry.  It was then that Bill Gates came to his nation’s rescue.  Retiring from Microsoft, 
he secretly hired an actor to play the part of CEO so that he could pursue his dream of 
helping the nation’s defense.  Under the guise of a humble business school dean at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, the “real” Bill Gates devoted his considerable business 
acumen to managing the secret project, funded with his own wealth.     
The project has now reached a critical stage, and it is time to go public with a 
business plan that the nation’s civilian and defense leaders can review.  In this hour of 
need, Dean Gates has reached out to your project group (which, for some reason, he  
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has dubbed the D-Team) to develop the business case analysis to be submitted for 
public scrutiny.  Defenders of the status quo will be merciless in their review of your 
work.  Your analysis must be thorough, precise, and exhaustive.  The nation’s future 
may depend on how you perform this task. 
The data you need are all described as follows.  You must use this data to 
predict yearly costs and life-cycle costs for the new aircraft.  The public is weary of cost 
overruns on projects like these, so you must not only project a budgeted life-cycle cost 
but also assess the risk that the projected cost will be exceeded. 
Although the technical design of the aircraft is complete, several design 
alternatives are still available for critical components.  They involve, for example, the 
ability to invest in more expensive materials in order to reduce wear on a component, 
and hence, lengthen the mean time between failures (MTBF) for those components.  
Also, design of the logistics support process is not complete.  Key decisions such as the 
proper spare-parts inventory level for critical components must still be made.  Dean 
Gates looks to your project group, as logistics experts, to complete the design of the 
support processes for the aircraft.   
Typically, a small number of components contribute to most of the major logistics 
costs and degradation of readiness.  For this case study, you will consider only six 
components (as shown in the next section) for life-cycle cost and operational availability 
computation, assuming that these are major readiness degraders and high-cost items.   
With the logistics process and key component reliability still in play, life-cycle 
costs of course cannot yet be determined.  It will be possible to reduce up-front costs—
and possibly life-cycle costs—by reducing reliability and availability of aircraft.  So, your 
analysis must not only examine life-cycle costs but also reliability and, hence, the 
availability of the aircraft.  But you must keep in mind that planning for military 
operations will assume a certain guaranteed level of availability for this aircraft.  You 
must set that “planning threshold” for operational availability and also assess the risk 
that aircraft availability will fall below this threshold.  
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The F-XX 
The new aircraft that the F-Team has designed is code-named the F-XX.  It is a 
single-pilot, single-engine weapon system.  Its mission profile is classified.  The F-XX 
program life cycle is estimated to be 35 years (beginning in the current year), with an 
operational life of 30 years (beginning four years from now).  As aircraft are brought into 
service and lost (attrited), the effective operating life of a single aircraft will average 27 
years.  
The following three life-cycle cost categories should be covered in your analysis: 
1. Acquisition and Research, Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) 
Squadron Stand-up and Phase-Out and Disposal Cost & Salvage Value 
 
2. Personnel Requirements and Training Costs 
3. Operations and Maintenance (O&M) 
 
All dollar values that appear in this case study are in current-year constant dollars.  The current year is designated FY00, 
the next year is designated FY01, and so forth.   
Research, Development Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) and 
Acquisition Costs; Squadron Stand up and Phase out and 
Disposal Cost/Salvage Value 
 
RDT&E Costs: FY00  $150,000,000 
FY01  $175,000,000 
FY02  $200,000,000 
FY03  $200,000,000 
Initial year RDT&E costs can be taken as a constant.  Subject matter experts 
estimate that later-year costs may vary by as much as 10%.   
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 Acquisition Cost: 
Acquisition Time Line: Begins in FY03 (F-XXs will be fielded in the year 
following their production). 
Total Aircraft Acquired: 96 aircraft 
Annual Acquisition:  24 aircraft 
Unit Acquisition Cost: $50,000,000 
Support Equipment  $20,000 per aircraft 
Each copy of the F-XX has an average unit cost of $50 million. Support 
equipment costs $20,000 per aircraft.  These one-time costs are incurred when the F-
XXs are phased into the squadrons.    
Your life-cycle cost model does not need to incorporate factors such as 
reductions in unit cost attributable to learning curve theory and economies of scale, nor 
does it need to consider potential cost overruns due to change orders later in the life 
cycle.  The $50 million unit cost is the best-estimate average unit cost of all F-XX 
aircraft produced across the life cycle, accounting for those factors.   
If the F-XX production line closed and were reopened later in the life cycle, it 
would likely incur significant setup cost.  However, it is reasonable to assume that the 
production will be open for many years, since these aircraft will be sold to allied 
countries in the future. (See the Squadron Stand up and Phase Out Plan section.) 
Squadron Stand up and Phase out and Disposal Cost/Salvage Value 
The F-XX squadrons will be stood up and phase out two squadrons at a time with 
the following time line: 
Stand up:  FY04: 2 squadrons/12 aircraft each (24 total) 
FY05: 2 squadrons/12 aircraft each (24 total) 
FY06: 2 squadrons/12 aircraft each (24 total) 
FY07: 2 squadrons/12 aircraft each (24 total) 
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Decommission: FY31: 2 squadrons/12 aircraft each (24 total) 
FY32: 2 squadrons/12 aircraft each (24 total) 
FY33: 2 squadrons/12 aircraft each (24 total) 
FY34: 2 squadrons/12 aircraft each (24 total) 
Note that the acquisition and maintenance costs of the training aircraft will not be 
included in the case study.  
We assume that all aircraft will be in full operational mode at the beginning of the 
fiscal year when a squadron stands up; for example, 24 aircraft will be in operation in 
FY04 for the entire year.  We also assume that the aircraft will be decommissioned at 
the end of the fiscal year.   
 As squadrons stand down, the assigned aircraft will be sold to foreign military 
sales (FMS)–eligible countries.  The expected salvage value of each aircraft is $12.5 
million, 25% of the average procurement unit cost.   The savage value as well as 
disposal costs, if any, will be realized at the time of decommissioning.  Classified 
weapon systems will be removed before the FMS sales.  This disposal cost is estimated 
to be $250,000 per aircraft.     
An attrited aircraft will be replaced as needed at a future time.  The average 
attrition rate is estimated to be approximately 2% per year.   
Personnel and Training Requirements and Costs 
The F-XX aircraft system will be set up with eight squadrons.  Two squadrons on 
each coast of the continental U.S. (CONUS), and one squadron each for the Pacific, 
Indian, Mediterranean, and Atlantic Oceans will be stood up to accommodate the new 
system. Each squadron will have a total of 12 aircraft. 
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Personnel requirements and costs are as follows:  
Pilots and Ground Support Personnel (per squadron): 
-   17 Pilots 
-     4 Ground Support Officers 
-   16 Non-commissioned Officers (NCOs) 
- 176  Enlisted 
 
Headquarters Personnel (per squadron): 
- 2  Commanding Officer (CO) and Executive Officer (XO) (both are 
pilots) 
- 1 Administration Officer (non-pilot) 
- 2 NCOs 
- 4 Enlisted 
Average Personnel Cost per Year (cost to the DoD):  
- Pilot Officer  $180,000 
- Ground Officer $160,000 
- NCO   $110,000 
- Enlisted   $60,000 
See http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/rates/fy2013/2013_k.pdf for the DoD 
standard composite pay that includes standard benefits (housing, food, medical, etc., 
not including re-enlistment bonuses, combat pay, etc.).    
All F-XX personnel will require both basic and advanced levels of training.  To 
meet the requirements to fill an assigned billet, each person must be fully qualified in 
accordance with the designated classification code and pilots must complete all levels 
of flight training.  The squadron CO and the XO are both pilots.   It is assumed that 
these two senior officers (CO and XO) have previously completed basic flight training 
and that they only need to go through the advanced pilot training.  They also will take 
headquarters (HQ) basic and advanced training.   
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The annual personnel attrition rate is 20%, and additional personnel must be 
trained due to attrition.  The initial training will start one year prior to squadron 
activation, and the training program will be closed by the end of FY30.  The personnel 
attrition rate at the beginning of the life cycle would be lower than 20%, but we will 
assume a flat rate of 20% per year once the initial training cycle starts.  Required 
training time and costs are as follows: 
Pilots and Ground Personnel 
Basic   Advanced 
Officer 
Pilot 36 weeks 12 weeks 
Ground 12 weeks 2 weeks 
NCO 12 weeks 2 weeks 
Junior Enlisted 24 weeks 24 weeks 
Headquarters Personnel 
Basic Administration Training (Officers, NCOs, enlisted): 10  weeks 
Advanced Administration Training (Officers and NCOs):   3  weeks 
Training Costs  
Basic Training:     $2,000 / person / week 
Advanced Training: $3,000 / person / week 
Pilot Basic: $11,000 / person / week  
Pilot Advanced: $11,000 / person / week 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) 
Operations 
F-XX Flying Hours per Aircraft  40 hrs/month, or 480 hrs/year 
Operating Cost including Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant (POL) 
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Corrective Maintenance (CM) 
The MTBF, cost, and required protection level (spare fill rate, or customer service 
level) for some of the major components are as follows: 
Component Name MTBF Criticality Protection Level Unit Cost 
APU 250 Non-Critical 0.85 $100,000 
GEN 400 Critical 0.95 $ 250,000 
PAS 1000 Critical 0.95 $ 400,000 
AC 1000 Critical 0.95 $ 500,000 
LG 500 Critical 0.95 $ 400,000 
ENG 500 Critical 0.95 $ 2,000,000 
 
APU: Auxiliary Power Unit 
GEN:  Generator 
PAS:  Phased Array System (Radar)  
AC:  Avionic Computer 
LG:  Landing Gear 
ENG:  Engine 
Management of spare parts will be on a one-for-one exchange at the squadron 
level (organizational level, or O-level).  It takes two days to swap the failed component 
with a spare part, if the part is available.  For a critical component failure, the aircraft will 
be grounded until a ready-for-issue (RFI) spare part becomes available.  A failed 
component is sent to the Navy depot or contractor-managed depot for repair.  The 
required O&M factors are as follows: 
Each squadron’s activity has start-up fixed costs, which are incurred at 
$10,000,000 per activity prior to squadron activation.  Additionally, operating variable 
costs, which are estimated at $5,000,000/year per O-level activity, are incurred for each 
year that a squadron is operational.  
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Transportation Cost:   $200 per failure  
Spare Inventory Carrying Rate:  15% of spare value per year 
Spare Parts Service Levels Levels (Protection Levels) 
Critical Units    95% 
Non-Critical Units   85% 
Repair Turnaround Time (TAT)  40 days 
Depot-Level Repair Costs   $5,000 per repair 
O-Level Activation $10,000,000 for each O-Level 
activity 
O-Level Operating Costs   $5,000,000/yr per squadron 
Some uncertainty remains in certain O&M factors.  Engineers from F-Team 
have proposed alternatives that involve additional up-front investments that can 
potentially lower turnaround times and increase MTBF for critical components to 
improve readiness and reduce the life-cycle cost.   
Preventative Maintenance (PM)  
Cost  10% of aircraft acquisition cost 
Interval 5 years 
TAT  90 days 
Mid-life Component Improvement Plan (CIP) 
Mid-life CIP  Begins in FY18  
2 squadrons per year 
CIP Costs  25% of aircraft procurement cost +  
4% of aircraft procurement cost for engineering 
RDT&E 
Interval  Scheduled once during the life cycle per aircraft 
TAT   90 days 
Case Questions 
1. What happens to the readiness and LCC of the F-XX Program if operating 
cost increases to $3,000 per hour from the current price of $2,000? 
2. What happens to the readiness and LCC if one of the components fails more 
often than advertised and the MMBF for that component drops down to 20% 
of the target value due to major design flaws?  
3. What happens to the readiness and LCC if the assumed depot repair 
turnaround times take three times longer than planned? 
4. What happens to the readiness and LCC if the assumed preventive 
maintenance (PM, or overhaul) turnaround times take three times longer than 
planned? 
5. Estimate the life cycle cost using the real annual discount rates ranging 
between 1 – 15% per year, respectively, and discuss what rate should be 
used for this project.    
6. Estimate the cost risk (e.g., the probability that the NPV of LCC of the 
program exceeds a certain threshold value) and the mission-readiness risk.  
First, try with the Crystal Ball built-in distributions embedded in the 
spreadsheet model. Then change or add some distributions and try one more 
time.  
7. If the Boss wants to cut down the critical spare parts service level from 95% 
to 85% to save inventory cost, describe what might happen to the readiness 
and LCC after considering the vicious cycle of the operational availability, 
reliability and the maintenance downtime as discussed during the class.  
Develop a hypothetical scenario to illustrate the impact.   
8. The sequestration has arrived, and requires an average of 5% cut to the NPV 
of LCC from the base case scenario provided in the spreadsheet.  These cuts 
should be made to minimize the impact on mission capacity.  Make some 
suggestions.   
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